Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to expect that computing the winner of an election is at least as hard as computing the score of a candidate. We show that this is not always the case. In particular, we show that for Young elections for dichotomous preferences the winner problem is easy, while determining the score of a candidate is hard. This complexity behavior has not been seen before and is unusual. For example, a common slight variant of Young has a hard winner problem for dichotomous preferences, and natural versions of Dodgson and Kemeny for dichotomous preferences have easy score and winner problems. * Research done in part while on sabbatical at ETH-Zürich.
Introduction
Election systems based on scores generally find a winner by computing the score of each candidate and a candidate is a winner if they have the best score. Most election systems have easy score problems and so finding a winner in this way is also easy. The three most-commonly studied election systems where this is not the case are Young [You77] , Dodgson [Dod76] , and Kemeny [Kem59] . The score problem for each of these systems is NP-complete and the corresponding winner problems are each Θ p 2 -complete [BTT89, RSV03, HHR97, HSV05]. In general it would seem like determining if a candidate is a winner of an election is at least as hard as determining the score of a candidate. In this note we show that this is not always the case. We show that for Young elections for dichotomous preferences the score problem is hard and the winner problem is easy. This is behavior that was not seen before in the computational study of voting. Dichotomous preferences are a very natural way for voters to state their preferences, where they approve of a subset of the candidates and disapprove of the others. Approval voting is the most well-known election system that uses dichotomous preferences as input. However, most voting rules have definitions that apply or can be naturally extended to dichotomous preferences.
The behavior of Young for dichotomous preferences is quite unusual. When we instead consider strongYoung elections, in which the score is based on how far removed the candidate is from becoming a Condorcet winner (rather than a weak Condorcet winner as in Young), the score and winner problems for dichotomous preferences are hard. Additionally, natural versions of Dodgson and Kemeny for dichotomous preferences do not exhibit Young's anomalous behavior: Their score and winner problems are in P. Note that the behavior for dichotomous preferences is very varied as illustrated in the table below, which summarizes our results. 
Score

Preliminaries
An election consists of a set of candidates C, and a set of voters V . Each voter v ∈ V has a corresponding vote (preference order) over the set of candidates. The most commonly studied model is for voters to state their preferences as a total order, i.e., strictly ranking all of the candidates from most to least preferred. Another natural way for voters to state their preferences is as a dichotomous order, where each voter approves of a subset of the candidates and disapproves of the remaining candidates. More formally, given a set of candidates C, a dichotomous vote v partitions C into two sets, A and B (which may be empty), with the vote written as (A > B), such that for all a ∈ A and for all b ∈ B, v states a > b (where > denotes strict preference) and v does not state strict preference between candidates in A nor between candidates in B.
An election system is a mapping from an election (a set of candidates and a set of voters) to a subset of the candidate set referred to as the winner(s). We are interested in the relationship between the complexity of the score and winner problems for election systems so we focus on election systems with computationally difficult score problems: Young [You77] , Dodgson [Dod76] , and Kemeny [Kem59] .
For our results and to define the election systems mentioned above, it will be useful to refer to Condorcet winners and weak Condorcet winners. A Condorcet winner is a candidate in an election that beats each other candidate by pairwise majority. Similarly, a weak Condorcet winner is a candidate that beats-or-ties each other candidate by pairwise majority.
The Young score of a candidate is the size of a largest subset of voters for which they are a weak Condorcet winner. A candidate is a Young winner if they have maximum Young score. Notice that the definition of Young applies to dichotomous preferences. We also consider the common slight variant of Young called strongYoung, in which the goal to to make a candidate a Condorcet winner (instead of a weak Condorcet winner).
For total order votes, the Dodgson score of a candidate is the fewest number of swaps between adjacent candidates in the voters' rankings such that they can become a Condorcet winner. A candidate is a Dodgson winner if they have minimum Dodgson score. The definition for weakDodgson is the same except we consider if a candidate can become a weak Condorcet winner. For dichotomous preferences, a natural analogue for Dodgson is to move candidates between the two groups in a dichotomous vote, which keeps the votes dichotomous, e.g., given the vote ({a, b} > {c, d}) we can move c up to get ({a, b, c} > {d}) with one move. A Kemeny consensus is a total order with minimal sum of Kendall tau distance to the voters, i.e., the sum over all unordered pairs of candidates {a, b} of the number of voters that disagree with the consensus on the relative order of a and b. The Kemeny score of a candidate is the minimal sum of Kendall tau distances to the voters for a total order that has the candidate as most preferred. For dichotomous preferences, we consider a variant of Kemeny introduced by Zwicker [Zwi18] called (2, 2)-Kemeny. In (2, 2)-Kemeny the votes and the consensus are each dichotomous. In (2, 2)-Kemeny, the score of (A > B) is the sum over all pairs a ∈ A, b ∈ B of the number of voters in V that prefer a to b minus the number of voters that prefer b to a, and we are looking to maximize the score.
Our computational results involve the classes P, NP, and Θ p 2 . The class Θ p 2 is the class of problems solvable by a P-machine with parallel access to an NP oracle.
Results
For total order votes, the winner problems for Young, strongYoung, Dodgson, weakDodgson, and Kemeny are Θ p 2 -complete [BBHH15, RSV03, HHR97, BBHH15, HSV05]. The Θ p 2 upper bound for these problems is shown as follows: Use the associated NP-complete score problem, which determines if the score of a candidate in an election is at least as good as k, and compute the scores of all candidates in parallel in polynomial time.
When we restrict ourselves to dichotomous preferences, a number of surprising things happen. Most surprising is that we will show that YoungWinner for dichotomous preferences is easy, but YoungScore remains NP-complete.
An election system is weakCondorcet-consistent if on every input that has at least one weak Condorcet winner, the winners of the election system are exactly the weak Condorcet winners. If an election has dichotomous votes then it has at least one weak Condorcet winner [Ina64] , which implies the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The winner problem for a weakCondorcet-consistent election system with dichotomous preferences is in P. This holds even for election systems that are weakCondorcet-consistent when restricted to dichotomous preferences.
Young Elections
Since Young is weakCondorcet-consistent [Fis77] , the following theorem follows from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 YoungWinner for dichotomous preferences is in P.
We will now show that YoungScore remains NP-complete for dichotomous preferences. And so the "natural" way of deciding YoungWinner by using YoungScore as an oracle is not optimal. In addition, in a curious turn of events, strongYoungWinner is still Θ p 2 -complete. There are not many cases where small changes in the definition of a system matter in this way. 1 Theorem 3 YoungScore for dichotomous preferences is NP-complete.
Proof. The upper bound is immediate. For the lower bound, we reduce from Independent-Set. Given a graph G = (V, E), let the candidate set be E ∪ {p} and let the voter set consist of the following voters.
• For each vertex v ∈ V ,
-One voter corresponding to v voting ({e ∈ E | v ∈ e} > · · · ).
• One voter voting ({p} > · · · ).
Note that the Young score of p is α(G) + 1, where α is the independence number of G, i.e., the size of a maximum independent set of G. This score is realized by the voter that ranks p first and a set of voters corresponding to a maximum-size independent set of G. Note that the proof of the current theorem does not contradict the previous statement that YoungWinner is in P, since p is clearly in general not a Young winner. Also note that this construction does not give NP-completeness for YoungScore for total orders. Not surprisingly, it turns out that that problem is also NP-complete (even to approximate [CCF + 12]). Somewhat surprisingly, a direct proof of NP-completeness is not given in the literature, so we will give it at the end of this section for completeness. It may be surprising that the construction for total orders is harder than the one for dichotomous preferences, because it may seem that a problem on total orders would be harder than the analogous problem for dichotomous preferences. However, for the plurality rule, control by adding voters can be NPcomplete for votes with ties [FH15] while it is in P for total orders [BTT92] . And it is easy to see that dichotomous votes suffice to get NP-completeness. ❑
The construction used in the proof above can be adapted for the score problem for strongYoung by adding an additional voter voting ({p} > · · · ). So we can state the following result.
Theorem 4 strongYoungScore for dichotomous preferences is NP-complete.
Theorem 5 YoungRanking for dichotomous preferences is Θ p 2 -complete.
Proof. Reduce from Min-Card-Independent-Set-Compare, in which we are given two graphs G and H with the same number of vertices and we ask if α(G) ≥ α(H). This problem is Θ p 2 -complete, which follows immediately from the Θ p 2 -completeness of the analogous problem for vertex covers [SV00] . Without loss of generality, assume that G and H do not have isolated vertices and that the sets of vertices are disjoint. Our reduction generalizes the YoungScore reduction from the proof of Theorem 3. We will ensure that the Young score of p is α(G) + 1 + V (H) + 1 and that the Young score of r is α(H) + 1 + V (G) + 1. This proves the theorem, since V (G) = V (H) .
Let the candidate set be E(G)∪E(H)∪{p, r} and let the voter set consist of the following voters.
Type I For each vertex v ∈ V (G),
• One voter corresponding to v voting
Type II
• One voter voting (E(H) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Type III For each vertex v ∈ V (H),
Type IV
• One voter voting (E(G) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Note that to realize the Young score of p, we should always include all the Type III and Type IV voters. The rest of the argument is as in the proof of Theorem 3. ❑
As was the case with the score problem above, we can easily adapt the construction for YoungRanking for dichotomous preferences to hold for strongYoungRanking. Add a voter voting (E(H) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ) and a voter voting (E(G) ∪ {p, r} > · · · ).
Theorem 6 strongYoungRanking for dichotomous preferences is Θ p 2 -complete.
As stated in Theorem 2, YoungWinner is in P for dichotomous votes. In contrast, the winner problem for strongYoung for dichotomous votes is Θ p 2 -complete.
Theorem 7 strongYoungWinner for dichotomous preferences is Θ p 2 -complete.
Proof. The main insight here is that you can always make sure that a candidate c's strongYoung score is 0, by adding a candidate c ′ and making sure that c and c ′ are tied in every vote. We adapt the construction used to show that strongYoungRanking is Θ p 2 -complete. For each e ∈ E(G) ∪ E(H), add a candidate e ′ and make sure that e and e ′ are tied in every vote. ❑
For completeness, we now give a direct proof of the NP-completeness for YoungScore and strongYoungScore for total order preferences. It is interesting to note that this result does not follow from the Θ p 2 -completeness of YoungWinner and strongYoungWinner. Under the assumption that NP does not have p-measure 0, there exists a set A that is NP-complete under truth-table reductions, but not NP-complete (under many-one reductions) [LM96] . Note that YoungWinner and strongYoungWinner are in P A tt , while A is not NP-complete. We modify the reduction implicit in Fitzsimmons et al. [FHHN18] (which in turn is based on the reduction in Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel [RSV03] ). We will reduce Independent-Set to YoungScore.
Given a graph G = (V, E), with no isolated vertices, let the candidate set be E ∪ {a, c} and let the voter set consist of (in the description below, if we list a set we mean the set in some total order):
• One voter voting (c > · · · > a).
Type III
• 2 V voters voting (· · · > c > a).
The argument from Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel [RSV03] shows that if α(G) ≥ 3, the Young score of c is 2α(G). Note that this score is realized by a set of voters whose subset of Type-I voters corresponds to a maximum independent set. For strongYoungScore, add a voter voting (c > · · · > a). The strongYoung score of c is then 2α(G) + 1.
Dodgson Elections
We now show that the complexity behavior of Young for dichotomous preferences does not occur for Dodgson and Kemeny for dichotomous preferences. 2 Recall that for Dodgson for dichotomous preferences a candidate can only be swapped up from disapproved to approved or swapped down from approved to disapproved. So unlike in the case for total orders, to determine the score of a candidate we cannot just consider swaps that move that candidate up. For example, given the vote ({a, b} > {c, d}), for c to beat a pairwise, we first need to move c up to get ({a, b, c} > {d}) and then move a down to get ({b, c} > {a, d}). (You could of course also do these moves in the reverse order.) With this in mind, we can show that DodgsonScore and weakDodgsonScore are each in P.
Theorem 8 DodgsonScore and weakDodgsonScore, for dichotomous preferences, are each in P.
Proof. First notice that moving p up from the set of disapproved candidates in a vote to the set of approved candidates decreases #(a > p) − #(p > a) by 1 for every candidate a ∈ C − {p}. And it is not possible to decrease #(a > p) − #(p > a) by more than 1 with one move. So, the weakDodgson score of p is the max over all candidates a ∈ C − {p} of #(a > p) − #(p > a): We can make p a weak Condorcet winner by moving p up from disapproved to approved in that many votes and it is easy to see that there are enough votes to do this. So, weakDodgsonScore is in P.
For DodgsonScore, if p starts out as a Condorcet winner, the score is 0. Otherwise, we need to move p up in one more vote compared to what was needed to make p a weak Condorcet winner. If no such vote exists then for some candidate a, a > p in each original vote. In this case, move p up in every vote. And then for every candidate a for which a and p are tied, move that candidate down. So, DodgsonScore is also in P. ❑
Since DodgsonScore and weakDodgsonScore are each in P for dichotomous preferences, the corresponding winner problem is also in P. 3
Theorem 9 weakDodgsonWinner and DodgsonWinner, for dichotomous preferences, are each in P.
Kemeny Elections
Zwicker [Zwi18] shows that the winner problem for (2, 2)-Kemeny is in P. A similar argument to what is used in the proof of Lemma 3 from Zwicker [Zwi18] can be used to show that the corresponding score problem is also in P.
Theorem 10 (2, 2)-KemenyScore is in P.
